We set out to find ways to help decision makers overcome the "winner's curse," a phenomenon commonly observed in asymmetric information bargaining situations, and instead found strong support for its robustness. In a series of manipulations of the "Acquiring a Company Task," we tried to enhance decision makers' cognitive understanding of the task. We did so by presenting them with different parameters of the task, having them compare and contrast these different parameters, giving them full feedback on their history of choices and resulting outcomes, and allowing them to interact with a human opponent instead of a computer program. Much to our surprise, none of these manipulations led to a better understanding of the task. Our results demonstrate and emphasize the robustness of the winner's curse phenomenon.
1.

Introduction
Abundant evidence demonstrates that decision makers at times systematically deviate from rational behavior. Deviations from rationality have been found in individual decision-making tasks (e.g. Allais, 1953; Tversky and Kahneman, 1974; Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Bazerman, 2002) , as well as in interactive situations with a social context (e.g. Bazerman, Curhan, Moore and Valley, 2000; Grosskopf and Nagel, 2001) . As these biases hinder the quality of decision-making in countless domains, including economics, politics, and medicine, it is important to study ways to overcome them.
The current research focuses on the tendency of decision makers to ignore the decisions of others and the resulting consequences. As a result of this tendency, decision makers commonly develop inferior bidding strategies in bilateral bargaining situations with asymmetric information that lead to negative profits -a phenomenon known as the winner's curse. We examine whether decision makers can learn to overcome this bias if they are given feedback that aims to trigger their cognitive understanding by focusing on the obstacles to learning that were found in prior studies.
In this study we use the "Acquiring a Company Task," originally studied by Samuelson and Bazerman (1985) , and based on Akerlof's (1970) article on the "market for lemons." 1 In the "Acquiring a Company Task," participants engage in a bilateral negotiation over a company with a value, v, that is uniformly distributed between 0 and 100, and with the value to the buyer being 1.5*v. However, only the seller knows the exact value of the company at the time bids are submitted. Since one side (the seller) has more information than the other (the buyer), it will only accept offers that are higher or equal to v. Consequently, the expected value of any accepted positive bid is negative, as is demonstrated in the following equation: E(bid/bid>v)= 1.5*E(v|bid>v) -bid = 1.5*bid/2 -bid = -0.25*bid. The negative expected value is driven by the fact that the seller only accepts offers that are higher than his valuation. The less-informed side (the buyer) should anticipate this selective acceptance and its consequences, and thus should not submit any bid at all. Yet previous studies have shown that participants consistently bid amounts that are significantly greater than zero; most bids lie between the expected value of the company (50) and the ex-ante expected value of the company to the buyer (75) (e.g. Bazerman and Samuelson, 1983 ). An analysis of participants' "think-aloud transcripts" revealed that participants simplified their decision task by ignoring the selective acceptance of the other side that is a consequence of the information asymmetry. Participants seemed to treat the problem as if the seller was not better informed than they were (Carroll, Bazerman and Maury, 1988; Tor and Bazerman, 2003 ).
An important question regarding biases is whether agents can learn to overcome them. It is well accepted among economists that optimal behavior should not necessarily be expected right away, but is likely to evolve through the process of learning and adjustment (Kagel, 1995) . In fact, the field of experimental economics has demonstrated that behavior frequently, but not necessarily, converges to rationality with experience (e.g. Coursey, Hovis and Schultze, 1984; Smith, 1985; Roth and Erev, 1995) . In contrast, participants in the "Acquiring a Company Task" have exhibited a strong persistence in sub-optimal behavior, even when given extended experience with the task. Ball, Bazerman and Carroll (1991) gave participants 20 trials of the "Acquiring a Company
Task" with financial incentives and full feedback. After each trial, participants were told the "true" (i.e., realized) value of the company, whether their bid was accepted, and how much money they gained or lost. Only 5 out of 69 participants in the experiment decreased their bids over the 20 trials to a value close to zero; the rest of the participants demonstrated almost no learning.
Early criticism of the Ball et al. study focused on the uniqueness of the right answer (bidding zero), arguing that there exists a demand characteristic to bid, rather than to do nothing. However, Selten, Abbink and Cox (2001) found similar overbidding even when the optimal response was to bid a positive amount and even when participants were given 100 trials to gain experience. Foreman and Murnighan (1996) tried to improve learning in the "Acquiring a Company" task by providing participants with opportunities for both experiential and observational learning. In this study, MBA students engaged in four repetitions of auctions and the "Acquiring a Company Task" over four weeks with ample time for reflection about the tasks. In addition, students were given information about the bids and outcomes of other participants. In line with previous studies, none of the manipulations helped participants to avoid the curse.
More promising results regarding the ability to overcome the winner's curse were reported by Ball et al. (1991) and Bereby-Meyer and Grosskopf (2002) . Ball et al. (1991) had participants reverse roles in order to make the information asymmetry more salient to the buyers. For the group that switched roles, the number of learners (defined as participants who bid zero from some trial on until the end of the experiment) increased from 9 percent to 37 percent. However, those not defined as learners only reduced their mean bid by a small amount, from 50 to 34. Moreover, changes in bidding generally occurred at the beginning of the second session in which roles were reversed, and almost no adjustment occurred during the second session. Approaching the problem from an adaptive learning perspective, Bereby-Meyer and Grosskopf (2002) show that a steady decline in bids is achieved by reducing the variability in the feedback that participants receive. However, no indication of a deep understanding of the task was observed; i.e., participants drifted in the correct direction, but did not understand the adaptation well enough to decide not to bid.
Overall, the "Acquiring a Company Task" has demonstrated surprising robustness, refuting many of the early criticisms that the observed irrational behavior would be easily corrected with experimental variation. This robustness led us to pursue an alternative approach to learning. Most of the research on learning in the "Acquiring a
Company Task" reviewed above gave participants feedback only on the outcome of the task, i.e., the value of the company and the profit for the buyer. In contrast, Doherty and Balzer (1988) argue that feedback is the process by which an environment returns to individuals a portion of the information in their response output necessary to compare their present strategy with a representation of an ideal strategy. The psychological literature on feedback identifies two main categories: outcome feedback versus cognitive (Balzer, Doherty, O'Connor, 1989) or process feedback (Hammond, Stewart, Brehmer and Steinmann, 1975) . Outcome feedback is simply knowledge of the outcome of a decision. Cognitive or process feedback refers to information about relations in the environment rather than outcomes.
Outcome feedback tends to be less effective in improving accuracy and performance than cognitive or process feedback (Balzer et al., 1989; Hammond, Summers and Deane, 1973) ; this is especially true for complex tasks (Brehmer, 1980; Hammond et al., 1975; Hoffman, Earle and Slovic, 1981) . Moreover, for feedback to directly improve learning, it must help the recipient to reject erroneous hypotheses (Kluger and DeNisi, 1996) . Consequently, the resistance of the sub-optimal behavior in the "Acquiring a Company Task" to various learning manipulations may be the result of the type of feedback given to participants. As shown by Bereby-Meyer and Grosskopf (2002) , even if a participant behaves sub-optimally, she can gain a positive amount of money approximately 33 percent of the time her offer is accepted. In fact, the participant may well be examining these profitable cases to determine what made her decision so good. Since participants are focusing on outcome feedback, it is difficult for them to make the connection between the asymmetric information and its effects on their payoffs.
In the current study, we give participants cognitive feedback in addition to outcome feedback. The cognitive feedback was an understanding of the key parameters that drive bidding behavior in the "Acquiring a Company Task." Specifically, participants are lulled into bidding due to the fact that buyers (1) value the company more than the seller (Carroll et al., 1988) and (2) ignore the impact of asymmetry of information (Carroll et al., 1988; Tor and Bazerman, 2003) . In the current study, we attempted to overcome these two barriers. We reasoned that if participants appreciate these two characteristics of the game, they are much more likely to refuse to bid.
In our experimental setup we manipulated either (1) the additional value of the company to the buyer or (2) the information setup (symmetry/asymmetry). We hoped that presenting participants with variations on the task elements that were found to impede performance, and having participants compare and contrast the different scenarios, would trigger a deep understanding of the task and teach participants to overcome the bias. Using contrasts or highlighting differences has been found to facilitate perceptual learning (Bransford, Franks, Vye, and Sherwood, 1989) , the learning of problem-solving principles (VanderStoep and Seifert, 1993) , and concept acquisition (Tennyson, 1973) . In the analogical reasoning literature it has been demonstrated that a "near-miss" contrast (Winston, 1975) , or a contrasting example that differs in one important aspect from the study problem at hand, is effective in helping people abstract a solution schema and subsequently apply it to an analogous test problem (Gick and Paterson, 1992; Ross and Kilbane, 1997) .
The first condition of Experiment 1 examines the effect of variations in the additional value of the company to the buyer (hereafter "Varying k") on learning.
Participants engaged in 100 trials of the "Acquiring a Company Task," divided into 5 parts of 20 trials each. Within the 20 trials of each of the five parts, the additional value of the company to the buyer was fixed at either 20 percent more or 150 percent more, while the information setup was fixed as asymmetric; i.e., the seller knew the value of the company when evaluating the bids, but the buyer did not. When the value of the company to the buyer is 20 percent more than the value of the company to the seller, the expected value of any accepted positive bid is negative, as demonstrated by the following equation: E(bid/bid>v) = 1.2*E(v|bid>v) -bid = 1.2*bid/2 -bid = -0.4*bid.
Consequently, the optimal bid is zero. By contrast, when the company is worth 150 percent more to the buyer than to the seller, the expected value of any accepted positive bid is positive, i.e., E(bid/bid>v)= 2.5*E(v|bid>v) -bid = 2.5*bid/2 -bid = 0.25*bid.
Consequently, in this case it is optimal to bid 100.
In a second condition of Experiment 1, we varied the setup of asymmetric versus symmetric information, i.e., whether the value of the company is known to the seller before bids are evaluated or not, hereafter "Symmetric-Asymmetric". In this condition, we left the additional value to the buyer constant at 50 percent. Again the 100 trials were divided into 5 parts of 20 trials each. During the 20 trials of asymmetric information, the optimal bid is zero, as was demonstrated before. During the 20 trials of symmetric information, in which buyers were told that the sellers were expected-value maximizers and had the same distributional knowledge as the buyers, the optimal bid should be just one monetary unit above the expected value of the company to the seller, i.e., 51 in our setup. 2 In a third condition of Experiment 1, we varied the information setting and asked participants explicitly to compare and contrast the parts of symmetric information with the parts of asymmetric information (hereafter "Symmetric-Asymmetric with
Comparison").
The current paper shows that despite this cognitive feedback, participants continue to overbid. Moreover, bidding behavior in trials when the seller and the buyer had the same amount of information (i.e., symmetric information) was similar to the bidding behavior when the seller had more information (i.e., asymmetric information), even when participants were explicitly asked to compare and contrast the two conditions. This indicates that participants continue to ignore the seller's informational advantage in the asymmetric information condition and its consequences. In Experiment 2 participants faced a real seller instead of a computer program resembling the seller. This was done to make the situation more closely resemble the real word, thereby increasing the probability that participants would consider the perspective of others. In addition, we gave participants information about "foregone payoffs," i.e., payoffs of bids that were not submitted. By seeing what they could have received by doing something else, this manipulation aimed to emphasize the negative expected payoff from bidding. However, in this experiment too, participants continued to overbid. These two experiments demonstrate the robustness of the winner's curse phenomenon in the "Acquiring a
Company Task" in the face of cognitive learning manipulations.
Experimental Design and Results
Experiment 1
Method
Participants:
Ninety participants recruited from the Boston area, aged 18 to 60, participated in this study and were paid according to their performance. They received a $10 show-up fee and had the opportunity to earn up to an additional $10.
Procedure:
The computerized experiment was run in the experimental laboratory at Harvard Business School and included four conditions: (1) Control, (2) Varying k, (3) SymmetricAsymmetric, and (4) Symmetric-Asymmetric with Comparison. 3 In all conditions of Experiment 1, participants played the role of buyers in the "Acquiring a Company Task" for 100 trials, divided into 5 parts of 20 trials each. In each trial, in each of the parts, participants were asked to determine a price they would like to offer for the company.
They were told that the value of the company is distributed uniformly between 0 and 100, and that a computer program represents the seller. At the beginning of the experiment each participant received an endowment of 1,500 points worth 0.7 cents each. The feedback after each trial included (1) the realized value of the company, (2) the value of the company to the buyer, and (3) the buyer's profit/loss.
(A) Control Condition
In the "Control" condition the k-value in all five parts was the same; i.e., the company was worth 50 percent more under the buyer's management than under the seller's management. The seller knew the true value of the company before bids were evaluated.
The buyer did not know the company's true value; hence the information setup was asymmetric.
(B) Varying k Condition
In the "Varying k" condition, the basic procedure was the same as in the Control condition, except for the fact that the values of k alternated from one part of 20 trials to the other. Half of the participants in this condition saw a sequence of: 1.2, 2.5, 1.2, 2.5 followed by 1.5, and the other half saw the reversed order: 2.5, 1.2, 2.5, 1.2 followed by 1.5. The last part of 20 trials was kept the same over all manipulations (k=1.5, asymmetric information) in order to evaluate performance and compare the different conditions. Participants were informed that the value of k would vary in each part and that they would be informed about the exact value prior to starting a new part. Clearly, when k = 1.2, participants should not bid, and when k = 2.5, the payoff maximizing choice is to bid 100.
(C) Symmetric-Asymmetric Condition
In the "Symmetric-Asymmetric" condition the procedure was the same as in the "Varying k" condition, except that instead of varying the additional value to the buyer (k), we varied the information setting. Participants were informed about the fact that sometimes the seller will know the exact value of the company before bids are evaluated and sometimes he will not. Here, too, we ran two orders: one that started with 20 trials of the asymmetric setting and one that started with 20 trials of the symmetric setting. In both information settings, however, the value of the company to the buyer was kept constant at k=1.5. And, as before, both orders ended with 20 asymmetric trials, to be compared to the "Control" condition.
(D) Symmetric-Asymmetric with Comparison
The basic procedure in this condition was similar to the "Symmetric-Asymmetric" condition, except for the following changes. First, we gave participants only one sequence -Asymmetric, Symmetric, Asymmetric, Symmetric, Asymmetric -because we did not find any difference resulting from the sequence that participants experienced.
After every 40 trials (after the completion of two different parts of 20 trials each), participants saw the full history of their offers, the value of the companies, and their profit in each trial. The computer screen was divided: on one side participants received feedback for the symmetric information trials and on the other side they received feedback for 20 trials of the asymmetric information; we did this to make the differences between the two conditions more salient. To further help participants compare the different conditions, we asked two questions after every 40 trials: (1) "What is the key difference between the two parts?" and (2) "Identify an overall principle that should guide your decision regarding how much to offer in each part." We hoped that these questions would facilitate the extraction of the general rule, "do not bid in the asymmetric information setting with k=1.5." To give participants the opportunity to explore the game without risking money, the first 40 trials were unpaid learning trials. In the remaining 60 trials, participants received 1,500 points as endowment and each point was worth 0.012 cents.
Results
An Anova analysis on the mean bid in the last part (after 80 trials) as a dependent variable and the condition as an independent variable revealed no significant difference between conditions (F(3, 86)=1.56, p<0.2, MSe=467.6). The mean and standard deviations of the bids in the last 20 trials (k=1.5, asymmetric information) are presented in Table I .
To deepen our understanding of the learning process in the different conditions, we examined the mean bids per block of 20 trials in the different conditions. Figure 1 presents the mean bids and their standard deviation in the five parts of the "Control" condition. 5 As can be seen, almost no adaptation (towards choices of zero) occurred as a function of experience. Neither the mean nor the variance changed as a function of experience. condition for both sequences. As can be seen, participants differentiated between the different k-values; their bids were higher when k = 2.5 than when k = 1.2, yet the bids were too low when k = 2.5 (less than 100) and too high (greater than zero) when k = 1.2.
Condition
When participants faced a k-value of 1.5 in the last 20 trials, their mean bids were higher than were the mean bids when k = 1.2, indicating that the k-value seems to serve as an anchor according to which bids are adjusted. Observing that bids are a function of the kvalue leads us to believe that participants did not gain a deep understanding of the general principle. A deeper understanding of the task would manifest itself in no difference in mean bids across a k-value of 1.2 and 1.5, since the correct answer is zero in both cases.
No difference was found in the mean bids in the last 20 trials of the different sequences. In summary, our results reveal that neither changing the k-value nor changing the information setting helps participants overcome the winner's curse. Although participants bid differently depending on the value of k, they do not pay attention to the information setting and specifically to whether the seller has better information than they have themselves. As a result, bidding behavior in the symmetric case was similar to bidding behavior in the asymmetric case. The inability to differentiate between the two settings persisted even when participants were explicitly asked to compare the two.
Experiment 2
Method
To make the negative expected profit from bidding in the SymmetricAsymmetric condition more salient, we included a real seller instead of a computer program in Experiment 2. We also gave participants feedback on the payoff they would have gotten if they had submitted any other bid; i.e., we provided foregone payoff information given the realization of the value of the company. Note that while participants in Experiment 1 could compute this information, in Experiment 2 it was explicitly provided. This foregone payoff feedback should help participants realize that even if they won by submitting a positive bid in a specific trial, on average, it is not worthwhile to bid. In addition, sellers were assigned the role of buyers for the last 20 trials (against a computer again). We hoped to examine whether playing the role of the seller before playing the role of the buyer would make the asymmetric information more obvious to the buyer. 6 We also wanted to have a clear-cut comparison of what participants learned in the experiment. Therefore, before participants had any experience with the task (and before they even knew they would participate in 100 trials), we asked them what they thought the optimal bid was. At the end of the experiment, after 100 trials, we asked participants what they would advise a friend to bid in such a setting. The ability to transfer learned skills to other people has been suggested as one of the main factors that distinguishes experience from expertise (Bazerman and Neale, 1993 giving advice allows participants to reveal their knowledge of the best strategy, a knowledge they might not have been able to reveal during the course of the experiment due to risk-taking behavior they could have developed in the loss domain (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979) .
Participants:
7 In contrast to studies on how advice affects behavior in intergenerational settings (e.g. Schotter and Sopher, 2001), our advice is purely hypothetical and does not have any payoff relevance. Moreover, we focus on the adviser's behavior, whereas studies of intergenerational settings explore advisee's behavior.
Twenty students of industrial engineering at Ben Gurion University in Israel participated in the experiment for course credit. In addition, they could earn an average of 10 Israeli Shekels (around $2.50) depending on their performance.
Procedure:
The experiment included two conditions: "Control" and "Foregone payoff." The basic procedure of the two conditions was similar to the "Symmetric-Asymmetric with
Comparison" condition in Experiment 1, except for the fact that the seller was a human participant and not a computer program.
Participants were randomly assigned to one of the two conditions, and were assigned to be either sellers or buyers for 80 trials (five sellers interacted with five buyers in each condition). They were re-matched after every trial with a different partner. In both conditions, at the beginning of the experiment, after reading the "Acquiring a Company Task" but before experiencing it or finding out that they would engage in 100 trials of the task, participants were asked to supply the optimal bid.
Similarly, at the end of the experiment, participants were asked to advise a friend who was about to participate in the same experiment under the same conditions on the optimal offer. They were asked to give advice under two conditions: 1) the seller knows the value of the company and 2) the seller does not know the value of the company.
Results
For the "Control" condition, the mean of the optimal offer given before the start of the experiment was 72.6 (correct answer = 0). The mean advice after the 100 learning Examining the offers that were given as advice also revealed no improvement as a function of experience. It is important to notice that even after 100 trials in which participants experienced the two types of information settings, i.e., symmetric and asymmetric, their advised bids were almost the same for the two settings. However, if we compare advised bids after the 100 trials with the initial best guess of the optimal bid, we can report some learning (72.6 compared with 47.5). Yet the fact that participants did not differentiate between the symmetric and asymmetric setting shows that participants did not acquire a deep understanding of the task. For the "Foregone Payoff" condition, the mean initial guess of the best offer was 79.2. This guess is not significantly different from the initial mean guess in the "Control" condition (72.6). The mean advice after the 100 learning trials was 54.37 when the seller knows the value of the company, and 58.33 when the seller does not know the value of the company. Again, the latter two values were not significantly different from each other. Figure 7 presents the mean bid for every block of 20 trials. As can be seen, no improvement in learning was found in this condition compared to the "Control" condition when the foregone payoff information was not explicitly provided.
Additionally, we observe that the behavior of participants who had different roles (buyers or sellers respectively) for the first 80 trials no longer differed.
The current results show that even when participants are given information regarding the expected payoff for every other possible bid, they remain unable to learn not to bid.
Discussion
A common bias in decision-making is the inability of decision makers to adjust their behavior in anticipation of their opponents' choices and the resulting consequences. Research on the effect of learning in this task reveals some adaptation of behavior towards the optimal solution with no indication of a deep understanding of the problem (Bereby-Meyer and Grosskopf, 2002) . In most of the studies that examined learning in the "Acquiring a Company Task," participants received mere outcome feedback, which has been found to be ineffective at improving performance in complex tasks (e.g. Brehmer, 1980; Hammond et al., 1975; Hoffman, Earle and Slovic, 1981 ). In the current study, in addition to outcome feedback we gave participants process (i.e., cognitive)
feedback that aimed to deepen their understanding of the task. By isolating and separately manipulating the two main barriers to improved decision making in this task, we let participants experience a situation in which it is not optimal to bid, followed by one in which it is optimal to submit positive bids. We did this by either increasing the additional value the target company has to its new owner or by changing the information setup to include a scenario in which even the seller does not know the value of the company at the time when bids are evaluated. Based on the problem-solving literature (e.g. VanderStoep and Seifert, 1993; Gick and Paterson, 1992 ; Ross and Kilbane, 1997),
we expected that by presenting bidders with situations in which it is worthwhile to bid and situations in which it is not worthwhile to bid, they would extract the general principles for optimal bidding. However, we did not find any improvement in participants' performance, not even when they were explicitly asked to compare and contrast the different scenarios (Experiment 1).
Thinking that the fact that the other side is not a real decision maker might interact and confound the desired effect of the manipulations, we therefore also studied the "Acquiring a Company Task" with a real seller. Additionally, we gave participants feedback not only on their obtained payoff, but also on the foregone payoff; i.e., we
explicitly told them what they would have earned if they had submitted a different bid.
Again, we did not observe any improvement in performance (Experiment 2).
Not so long ago, experimental researchers believed that the process of improving judgment would occur naturally as individuals receive feedback about their past decisions. For example, Kagel and Levin (1986, p. 917) Einhorn and Hogarth, 1978) . . . any claim that a particular error will be eliminated by experience must be supported by demonstrating that the conditions for effective learning are satisfied (Tversky and Kahneman, 1986, pp. s274-s275) ."
The data in the current experiment point to the predictive ability of Kahneman and
Tversky over Kagel and Levin, at least as far the "Acquiring a Company Task" is concerned.
We conclude that the winner's curse observed in the "Acquiring a Company
Task" is very robust. It seems as if the fact that sub-optimal choices (bids greater than zero) sometimes lead to positive payoffs imposes yet another barrier to overcoming the underlying bias. The tendency of decision-makers to adaptively make their choices based on past experience impedes the effectiveness of cognitive feedback.
While the value of learning is too important to abandon, we must conclude that the "Acquiring a Company Task", which requires little or no mathematical sophistication, is unlikely to be solved using conventional manipulations of experience. Building off the work of Thompson et al., (2000) on analogical reasoning, some current research suggests that having participants compare and contrast their choices within and across problems might shed light on effective learning mechanisms to improve decision making in the "Acquiring a Company" task and similar problems (e.g. Idson et al., 2003) . Please enter your identification number (the number you received at the lab entrance)
here: ______________ Please read along with me as I read the instructions. There will be opportunities to ask questions if the instructions are not clear.
The experiment consists of 100 rounds divided into 5 parts of 20 rounds each. Right now, you are given a general set of instructions. The necessary specifications for each part will be given to you prior to each new part on your computer screen.
In each round you will face the following general decision problem:
You will represent Company A (the potential acquirer), which is currently considering acquiring Company T (the target). You plan to pay in cash for 100% of Company T's shares but are unsure how high a price to offer. The main complication is this: the value of Company T depends directly on the outcome of a major oil exploration project it is currently undertaking. Indeed, the very viability of Company T depends on the exploration outcome. If the project fails, the company under current management will be worth nothing (0 points/share). But if the project succeeds, the value of the company under current management could be as high as 100 points/share. All share values between 0 points and 100 points are considered equally likely. By all estimates, the company will be worth considerately more in the hands of Company A (you) than under current management. In fact, the company will be worth 50% more under the management of A The different parts of today's experiment will vary to the extent that sometimes company T will know the results of the drilling project and sometimes it will not. You will be told at the beginning of each new part whether or not this is the case. You will be given this information on your computer screen. However, you will never know the results of the drilling project (the value of the company to its current owner) when deciding about your bid.
A computer program represents Company T. If Company T knows the value of its company, it will accept any offer that is greater than the (per share) value of the company under current management, and it will reject any bids below or equal to its true value.
Thus, if you offer 60 points/share, for example, Company T will accept if the value of the company to Company T is anything less than 60 points.
If Company T on the other hand doesn't know the exact value of its company, it will accept any bids higher than its expected value of the company and reject any bids equal to or less than its expected value. The expected value of the company is calculated assuming that all values from 0 to 100 are equally likely.
As the representative of Company A, you are deliberating over price offers in the range of 0 points/share to 150 points/share. Your bid should be expressed in integer values.
Company A's assets (your assets) are currently worth 1,500 points. You will have altogether 100 trials to bid on company T in order to increase the amount of company A's (and thus your) assets. If in any trial you bid less than the value of the company under the current management (or the expected value) your bid will be rejected and your assets will neither increase nor decrease. If you bid more than the value of the company under current management (or the expected value) your bid will be accepted and your assets will change by the difference between the value under your management and your bid.
Your assets can increase or decrease.
You are being paid on performance based on a rate of 7 cents for every 10 points. This means that, for example, if you end up with 1,000 points you will be paid $7.00 in addition to your show up fee. If you end up with 2,000 points you will be paid $14.00 in addition to your show up fee. Under no circumstances will you lose your show up fee.
Notice that acquiring the company is a neutral event -your performance will be judged only on the value of your assets at the end of the experiment.
There are two things, which I would like to stress before you begin the experiment. First, the instructions tell you that "you will have to bid on a company similar to company T every trial for the next 100 trials". By this we mean 100 chances to bid for different and independent companies. The true value of each company is equally likely to be any value between 0 and 100. The values of the 100 companies are randomly determined by the computer and are statistically independent. This means that knowing the value of the company or companies in any previous trial or trials gives you no information about what the value will be in the next trial. This means, for example, that if you observe a high value one trial you should neither believe that there is a trend for companies to have high values nor that the law of averages will cause the value in the next trial to be low.
Second, the instructions tell you that "acquiring a company is a neutral event -your performance will be judged only on the value of your assets at the end of the experiment". This means that you should not care about the number of companies that you acquire for any reason other than the fact that acquiring a company will either increase or decrease the value of your assets.
At the beginning of each part, you will be informed about the fact whether Company T knows the exact value of the company or not. In each trial you will have to enter the price you would like to offer into the corresponding box on the computer screen (shown below). After each trial you will be informed about the value of the company under current management, the value to you and your earnings in points.
This is what your input screen will look like:
(2) Please press this button after you have entered your price.
(1) Please enter the price that you want to offer here.
After each decision you will see the following feedback screen:
XX
Please press this button after you have reviewed your outcome and are ready for the new round.
Here you will see the accumulated payoff of all past decisions including this last one.
These are the points you got for the current decision.
This is the price that you offered in this example.
This is the value of the company under your management, XX*1.5. This is the value of the company under current management.
This number indicates how many decisions you have made until now. In this example you have made 1 decision so far.
At the end of the first part (after 20 rounds) you will see the following summary screen.
This is the number of points that you have accumulated throughout the 20 trials of part 1.
Summary Part 1:
Accumulated point in this part: xxxx points
Accumulated points up to now: xxxx points
By clicking the "ok" button you will continue with the experiment, however, some parameters will change. Please pay attention to the specifications on the next page.
This is the number of points that you have accumulated throughout the experiment.
100
At the very end of the experiment (after 100 trials) you will be shown the final summary screen.
100 100 XXXX XXXX XXXX
1,500 points
This is the number of points that you have accumulated throughout the 100 trials. This is the amount that you will receive in cash at the end of the experiment. This value is calculated by applying the following exchange rate: 10 points equal 7 cents.
Final points are calculated as the sum of the initial endowment and the accumulated points.
